DISABILITY, POLICING, AND PUNISHMENT:
AN INTERSECTIONAL APPROACH
JAMELIA MORGAN*
Disabled people of color are uniquely vulnerable to policing and
punishment. Proponents of police reform and, more recently, police abolition
note that disabled people, particularly people with psychiatric disabilities, are
vulnerable to citation and arrest.1 Indeed, data on the high percentages of
people in prisons and jails who report having a diagnosed disability lend
support to this claim. Some advocates have referred to the criminalization of
mental illness as a way to describe these vulnerabilities and ground their calls
for change in the criminal legal system.2 Yet, even the compelling charge that
mental illnesses are criminalized, or that prisons and jails are the “new
asylums,”3 fails to fully account for the ways that race and disability work in
tandem to render disabled people of color vulnerable to criminal legal system
involvement.4 A more comprehensive account of mass incarceration and how
it produces disability-based subordination is needed.
In this Essay, I provide a contemporary intersectional analysis of race,
gender, and disability—namely, the experiences of disabled people of color
in the criminal legal system, with a particular focus on policing and
punishment systems. Doing so, I argue, demonstrates more specifically the
unique vulnerabilities to policing and punishment that disabled people
experience as a class and is more attuned to the particular vulnerabilities of
disabled people of color. The sections that follow move beyond the
criminalization of the mental illness frame and instead frame dangerousness
and criminality as racist and ableist constructs that have been grafted onto
“mental illness.” The Essay then moves to a discussion of police violence
and mass incarceration, all while adding a disability lens to extant race-based
critiques.
* Professor of Law, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law. I would like to thank the
editors of the Oklahoma Law Review for their careful editing and helpful feedback.
1. JUDGE DAVID L. BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH L., “DEFUNDING THE POLICE”
AND PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 2 (2020), http://www.bazelon.org/wp-content/uploads/
2020/08/Defunding-the-Police-and-People-with-MI-81020.pdf.
2. See, e.g., E. Lea Johnston, Reconceptualizing Criminal Justice Reform for Offenders
with Serious Mental Illness, 71 FLA. L. REV. 515, 530–31 (2019).
3. See LIAT BEN-MOSHE, DECARCERATING DISABILITY: DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND
PRISON ABOLITION 15 (2020) [hereinafter BEN-MOSHE, DECARCERATING DISABILITY]
(critiquing this framework of using prisons and jails as new asylums).
4. Id. at 23.
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I. Police Violence
Notions of dangerousness and criminality are influenced by racialized and
ableist stereotypes. Though discussion of the origins of these stereotypes is
beyond the scope of the Essay, these stereotypes proliferated during the
height of the eugenics period. Theories linking criminality to mental defects
can be traced to Victorian-era criminology. Historian Philip Jenkins writes
that
[b]etween about 1830 and 1870, there emerged a number of
theories about the connection between crime and defective mental
states, and eugenics was essentially the synthesis of these wellestablished ideas. By the 1830s, an extensive literature had
developed on the existence of mental types such as the idiot,
imbecile or psychopath—all of whom fell short of insanity, but all
likely to be found overrepresented in the criminal population. At
the same time, phrenologists were suggesting that crime and evil
were physiological conditions resulting from the structure of the
brain. Thirdly, studies of criminal subcultures seemed to show the
existence of ‘bad families’ in which crime was almost hereditary.
By the 1860s, Morel had synthesized these theories to explain
crime as a component of his detailed classification of ‘degenerate’
types. Crime, idiocy, epilepsy, alcoholism, insanity, all were
likely to be found in ‘degenerate’ families.5
Scientific racism justified racist tropes, and stereotypes worked to align
Blackness with criminality. In the burgeoning fields of the social sciences,
mainly white scholars sought to “writ[e] race into crime.”6 Khalil Gibran
Muhammad’s groundbreaking work demonstrates how race-disability
constructs informed notions of criminality and Blackness:
Racial knowledge that had been dominated by anecdotal
hereditarian, and pseudo-biological theories of race would
gradually be transformed by new social scientific theories of race
and society and new tools of analysis, namely racial statistics and
social surveys. Out of the new methods and data sources, black
criminality would emerge, alongside disease and intelligence, as
a fundamental measure of black inferiority. From the 1890s
5. Philip Jenkins, Eugenics, Crime and Ideology: The Case of Progressive
Pennsylvania, 51 PA. HIST. 64, 65–66 (1984).
6. See KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME,
AND THE MAKING OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA 75 (2011).
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through the first four decades of the twentieth century, black
criminality would become one of the most commonly cited and
longest-lasting justifications for black inequality and mortality in
the modern urban world.7
These long-standing myths, stereotypes, and beliefs link ideas of Blackness
and disability with notions of criminality. Throughout the eugenics period
and through to today, these stereotypes not only racialized criminality but
also grafted ableist notions of disability into understandings of criminality.8
As I have argued elsewhere, racist-ableist constructs create vulnerabilities
to police violence and can create vulnerabilities to excessive and deadly force
by law enforcement.9 These constructs matter, because without an
intersectional account of subordination among disabled people, legal, policy,
and social protections can be dangerously underinclusive.10 Indeed, the
growing movement to transform policing and to end police violence has
captured public attention, and the movement has increasingly recognized
police violence disproportionately impacts disabled people.11 Black,
indigenous, and Latinx people with and without disabilities, as well as white
persons with disabilities, have recognized their vulnerabilities to policing and
police violence.12
In October 2016, Black Lives Matter activists denounced the shooting
death of Deborah Danner, a sixty-six-year-old Black woman with psychiatric
disabilities who was killed by NYPD officers during the course of what was
labeled a mental health crisis.13 A resident in Danner’s apartment building
had called the police to report that Danner was acting “erratically.”14 An
emergency medical technician testified that she had arrived before the NYPD
officer who shot Danner, Sergeant Hugh Barry, and was in the process of
7. Id. at 20–21.
8. See id. at xvii; BEN-MOSHE, DECARCERATING DISABILITY, supra note 3, at 5.
9. See, e.g., Jamelia N. Morgan, Policing Under Disability Law, 73 STAN. L. REV. 1401,
1424 (2021); Jamelia Morgan, Essay, Disability’s Fourth Amendment, 122 COLUM. L. REV.
489, 556 (2022) [hereinafter Morgan, Disability’s Fourth Amendment].
10. See, e.g., Morgan, Disability’s Fourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 574–75.
11. Id. at 504–06.
12. See id. at 501, 504–06.
13. Protest Held over NYPD Shooting of Deborah Danner in the Bronx, ABC 7 (Oct. 19,
2016), https://abc7ny.com/news/protest-held-over-nypd-shooting-of-deborah-danner-in-thebronx/1562150/; Chantal Da Silva et al., Black Lives Matter Anniversary: Deborah Danner Is
One of Many Who Did Not Have to Die, NEWSWEEK (July 12, 2018, 9:39 AM EDT),
https://www.newsweek.com/black-lives-matter-deborah-danner-one-many-who-did-nothave-die-1009807.
14. Da Silva et al., supra note 13.
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attempting to explain to Danner why the police were at her apartment.15
According to the EMT technician, the police interrupted this conversation.16
NYPD officers reported that when they arrived at Danner’s apartment door,
Danner was armed with a pair of scissors.17 Officers testified that they
persuaded Danner to put the scissors down.18 The EMT technician testified
that she saw Danner retreat back into her room and then heard two shots
fired.19 According to police testimony, Danner picked up a baseball bat and
swung at Sergeant Barry, one of the six officers who had followed her to her
bedroom.20 The officer then shot Danner two times in the chest, killing her.21
In a poignant essay titled Living with Schizophrenia, Danner describes in
intimate detail the experience of living day to day with the challenges and
stigma of schizophrenia.22 In one eerily prescient passage, she stresses the
importance of addressing the problem of police violence against people with
psychiatric disabilities. She writes, “We are all aware of the all too frequent
news stories about the mentally ill who come up against law enforcement
instead of mental health professionals and end up dead. We should all be
aware that these circumstances represent very, very serious problems that
need addressing.”23 In her letter, Danner references another high-profile
police shooting that took place over thirty years prior:
[One problem is] [t]eaching law enforcement how to deal with the
mentally ill in crisis so as to prevent another “Gompers” incident.
Many years ago, here in NY, a very large woman named Gompers
was killed by police by shotgun because she was perceived as a
‘threat to the safety’ of several grown men who were also police
officers. They used deadly force to subdue her because they were
15. James C. McKinley Jr., Medic Offers Sharply Different Account of Woman’s Death
at Hands of Police, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/01/
nyregion/barry-bronx-shooting-trial.html.
16. Id.
17. See id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See id.
21. Id.
22. Deborah Danner, Essay, Living with Schizophrenia (Jan. 28, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3146953/Living-With-Schizoph
renia-by-Deborah-Danner.pdf; Eli Rosenberg & Ashley Southall, In Quick Response, De
Blasio Calls Fatal Shooting of Mentally Ill Woman ‘Unacceptable,’ N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/20/nyregion/nypd-sergeant-fatal-shooting-bronx
-woman.html (providing a link to Danner’s essay).
23. Danner, supra note 22, at 4.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol75/iss1/10

2022]

DISABILITY, POLICING & PUNISHMENT

173

not trained sufficiently in how to engage the mentally ill in crisis.
This was not an isolated incident.24
Danner was likely referring to Eleanor Bumpurs, a sixty-year-old Black
woman with physical and psychiatric disabilities who was killed by NYPD
officers in October of 1984 during the course of eviction from her home in
the Bronx.25 Bumpurs was four months behind in her rent—less than $100
worth per month.26 NYPD officers alleged that Bumpurs attempted to attack
them with a knife, though the first shot blasted away half of her hand. 27
Reviewing the case, the Bronx District Attorney’s Office reported that “[i]t
was anatomically impossible for [Bumpurs] to hold the knife after the first
shot,” an indication that she posed no threat when the NYPD officer killed
her.28 Patricia Williams’s classic article, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger,
recounts the incident and how officials attempted to refute allegations of
racism in the officer’s actions, writing that “[a]s to whether this shooting of
a black woman by a white police officer had racial overtones, [Police
Commissioner Ward] stated that he had ‘no evidence of racism.’”29 Notably,
in public remarks, Bronx District Attorney Mario Merola noted that
“[o]bviously, one shot would have been justified. But if that shot took off
part of her hand and rendered her defenseless, whether there was any need
for a second shot, which killed her, that’s the whole issue of whether you
have reasonable force or excessive force.”30 As Williams opines,
In the Bumpurs case, the words of the law called for nonlethal
alternatives first, but allowed some officer discretion in
determining which situations are so immediately life endangering
as to require the use of deadly force. This discretionary area was
24. Id. (emphasis omitted).
25. See Julia Jacobo, Woman Killed by NYPD Had Written About ‘Problems’ on How
Police Deal with the Mentally Ill, ABC NEWS (Oct. 20, 2016, 3:21 PM), https://abcnews.
go.com/US/woman-killed-nypd-written-problems-police-deal-mentally/story?id=42938210.
26. Michael Wilson, When Mental Illness Meets Police Firepower; Shift in Training for
Officers Reflects Lessons of Encounters Gone Awry, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2003),
https://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/28/nyregion/when-mental-illness-meets-police-firepower
-shift-training-for-officers-reflects.html; Selwyn Raab, State Judge Dismisses Indictment of
Officer in the Bumpurs Killing, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 1985), https://www.nytimes.com/
1985/04/13/nyregion/state-judge-dismisses-indictment-of-officer-in-the-bumpurs-killing.
html (noting a monthly rent of $98.65).
27. Raab, supra note 26.
28. Id.
29. Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing
as the Law’s Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 132 (1987).
30. Id. at 131.
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presumably the basis for the claim that Officer Sullivan acted
legally. The law as written permitted shooting in general, and
therefore, by extension of the city’s interpretation of this law, it
would be impossible for a police officer ever to shoot someone in
a specifically objectionable way.31
Williams’s words help to explain why, doctrinally, cases involving police use
of deadly force against disabled people are so challenging—at least if the
concern is how to better protect disabled people. How the encounter is
framed—how the threat, relevant exigent circumstances, officer perceptions
of overt or covert conduct, etc. are framed—drives whether courts find
ultimately that the use of deadly force is objectively reasonable and therefore
justified.32
Considerable scholarly attention has been paid to the role of racial bias in
decision-making on whether to use force, as well as the amount of force,
including deadly force, against a suspect.33 Critical accounts have
acknowledged how the use of force is justified based on racialized fears,
stereotypes, and implicit biases.34 Beyond critiques, empirical studies support
these conclusions and show that Black people in particular, and negatively
racialized groups in general, are perceived by police officers as hyperthreatening, aggressive, violent, physically imposing, and even animal-like,
which may render them vulnerable to excessive force.35

31. Id. at 133.
32. See, e.g., Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CAL. L. REV. 391, 400 (2016).
33. Lorie A. Fridell, Racially Biased Policing: The Law Enforcement Response to the
Implicit Black-Crime Association, in RACIAL DIVIDE: RACIAL AND ETHNIC BIAS IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 39, 45–46 (Michael J. Lynch et al. eds., 2008); L. Song
Richardson, Police Racial Violence: Lessons from Social Psychology, 83 FORDHAM L. REV.
2961, 2962–66 (2015); Vida B. Johnson, KKK in the PD: White Supremacist Police and What
to Do About It, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 205, 227 (2019); Rory Kramer & Brianna Remster,
Stop, Frisk, and Assault? Racial Disparities in Police Use of Force During Investigatory
Stops, 52 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 960, 961 (2018).
34. Kenneth Lawson, Police Shooting of Black Men and Implicit Racial Bias: Can’t We
All Just Get Along, 37 U. HAW. L. REV. 339, 376 (2015); Kimberly Barsamian Kahn et al.,
How Suspect Race Affects Police Use of Force in An Interaction over Time, 41 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 117, 123 (2017); Ariela Rutbeck-Goldman & L. Song Richardson, Race and Objective
Reasonableness in Use of Force Cases: An Introduction to Some Relevant Social Science, 8
ALA. C.R. & C.L.L. REV. 145, 156 (2017).
35. See PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN 25 (2017); Jennifer L.
Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. 876, 876–78 (2004).
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Yet, there has been less attention paid in Fourth Amendment critical
scholarship to how similar constructions facilitate uses of force (and
excessive force) against disabled people and disabled people of color.36 As
discussed, pervasive social attitudes and stereotypes label disabled people as
suspicious, threatening, or dangerous.37 Beyond this, some stereotypes are
disability specific, which heightens vulnerabilities to police violence.
Individuals showing symptoms of psychiatric disabilities are often perceived
as wholly irrational, entirely unable to control themselves.38 These
stereotypes matter in policing. Such identity constructions cast doubt on the
utility of crisis intervention or de-escalation tactics, even in an era where
police departments, policymakers, and reformers tout the importance of such
approaches when dealing with people with psychiatric or intellectual and
developmental disabilities. As a policy matter, if a particular individual with
untreated psychiatric disabilities is depicted as “wild” and “dangerous,” law
enforcement can easily supplant as inappropriate public health approaches
calling for non-punitive forms of treatment and care. This risk is heightened
when police respond to a mental health crisis where it is easy for officers to
escalate the situation or resort to force to subdue perceived, though not
always actual, imminent threats. As a doctrinal matter, these identity
constructs inform and frame the nature of the encounter.39 As I discuss below,
often in situations where force is deployed against individuals in mental
health crises, events on the ground are framed as emergencies without much
interrogating by courts regarding the extent to which officer actions created
the emergency conditions that then created a perceived need for force.40

36. See Morgan, Disability’s Fourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 494.
37. Id. at 510–12.
38. Cf. Adrienne Asch, Critical Race Theory, Feminism, and Disability: Reflections on
Social Justice and Personal Identity, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 391, 409 (2001) (“If people labeled as
mentally ill are filing complaints of discrimination in employment, it may derive from the
existential anxiety occasioned by contact with someone whose behavior may be feared
unpredictable, out of their or our control, or whose modes of social interaction startle those
with the power to make employment decisions.”).
39. See, e.g., DAVID M. PERRY & LAWRENCE CARTER-LONG, THE RUDERMAN WHITE
PAPER ON MEDIA COVERAGE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT USE OF FORCE AND DISABILITY 18, 34, 39
(2016).
40. See Michael Avery, Unreasonable Seizures of Unreasonable People: Defining the
Totality of Circumstances Relevant to Assessing the Police Use of Force Against Emotionally
Disturbed People, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261, 274–75 (2003).
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I emphasize again that my intervention here is not to suggest that Fourth
Amendment doctrine is a catch-all solution to policing problems. The
disparities in use of force against people with multiple marginalized identities
may reflect not just police bias, but also societal failures to provide social
services, treatment, and other support.41 This is not to suggest that treatment
alone will lead to less police violence because, of course, mental disability or
intellectual/developmental disability is not itself the sole cause of police
violence and should not be depicted as such.42 This legal intervention is
aimed rather at insisting that courts heavily scrutinize disability in their
reasonableness analysis.
Finally, and fundamentally, fully recognizing the Fourth Amendment
rights of disabled people should contend with the notion that policing
produces disability or disabilities. Use of force is a compliance tool, and its
intent is to disable.43 Whether for the purpose of effectuating an arrest,
preventing escape, countering nonviolent or violent active or passive
resistance, coercing compliance with police directives, or mitigating a
perceived or actual threat, physical force is rendered to be disabling. Though
the central function of policing (compliance through force) affects all, it
inflicts intensified harms on disabled bodies and minds. Harms stemming
from police force can be intensified due to existing physical disabilities or
because pain-compliance tools are deployed against disabled people who are
unable to understand or respond to police directives, as when these tools are
used against individuals with psychiatric disabilities.
Race-disability constructs create pathways to police violence and justify
the use of force, including excessive and deadly force. Race-disability
constructs may, in fact, inform these determinations, but the failure to engage
critically with disability in use-of-force analysis means that disability’s role
in constructing the threat, exigent circumstances, or perceptions of the officer
is often unexplored or devalued. Camille Nelson’s work illuminates a
theoretical frame for examining how “[r]ace and disability morph into one

41. Diversion coupled with increased community-based treatment supports would go a
long way in eliminating, in Devon Carbado’s words, “pathways to police violence.” See
Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to Killing Black People: The Fourth
Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CAL. L. REV. 125 (2017); JUDGE DAVID L.
BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH L., supra note 1, at 5.
42. Cf. Johnston, supra note 2, at 534–35 (making a similar argument in discussion on
criminalization theory, recidivism, and “serious mental illness”).
43. See Est. of Armstrong v. Vill. of Pinehurst, 810 F.3d 892, 905 (4th Cir. 2016)
(referring to punching, wrestling maneuvers, and the use of pepper spray as “police officers’
more traditional tools of compliance”).
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another to construct the perfect criminal who is perceived as requiring the
use of disciplinary force and punishment.”44
In use-of-force cases, disabled bodies and minds are constructed as posing
physical barriers to compliance and total submission to police. Moore v. City
of Berkeley45 was a suit brought by the father of Kayla Moore, a Black trans
woman with psychiatric disabilities.46 On the day of her death, Moore’s
roommate called the police and informed them that Moore was having a
“psychotic episode.”47 Officers were dispatched to the scene.48 After arriving,
the officers attempted to handcuff Moore; one of the officers put his weight
on Moore’s torso, and another officer put pressure on her shoulder blades.49
Officers reported that Moore was resisting.50 Moore stopped breathing after
the struggle with multiple officers and later died.51
The district court found that the officers “had a diminished interest in using
force because they confronted, not someone who had committed a serious
crime, but someone who was mentally ill.”52 At the same time, the district
court determined that because Moore was so forcefully resisting arrest, the
officers had little choice but to restrain her in the way they did, and thus the
force was reasonable.53 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court.54
Notably, the Ninth Circuit’s affirmance did not mention Moore’s
schizophrenia in its review of the district court’s excessive-force analysis but
did mention Moore’s physical stature, noting that she “was a very large and
strong person.”55

44. Camille A. Nelson, Frontlines: Policing at the Nexus of Race and Mental Health, 43
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 615, 618 (2016) [hereinafter Nelson, Frontlines].
45. No. C14-00669 CRB, 2016 WL 6024530 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2016).
46. Id. at *1; Nomy Lamm, We Remember Kayla Moore, THE BODY IS NOT AN APOLOGY
(Mar. 2, 2015), https://thebodyisnotanapology.com/magazine/we-remember-kayla-moore/.
47. See Moore, 2016 WL 6024530, at *1.
48. Id.
49. Id. at *2.
50. See id. at *5.
51. Id. at *2. Despite the conduct from officers, the coroner concluded that the officers
did not contribute to her death. Id.
52. Id. at *5.
53. Id.
54. Moore v. City of Berkeley, 801 F. App’x 480, 484 (9th Cir. 2020).
55. Id. at 483. Although Moore’s schizophrenia was mentioned briefly in the court’s
recitation of the facts, the court failed to grapple specifically with her disability in its analysis.
See id. at 482.
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Racial meanings inform how behaviors and responses by disabled people
of color are interpreted.56 For negatively racialized and historically
marginalized groups, disability labels can be fabricated to produce
vulnerabilities to police violence or characterized as threatening to provide a
basis for justifying use of force. The controversial diagnosis of “excited
delirium” provides a useful and timely example. Excited delirium syndrome
is a commonly cited cause of in-custody deaths following confrontations with
law enforcement.57 The International Association of Chiefs of Police
(“IACP”) describes the symptoms of excited delirium syndrome as including,
but not limited to, “extreme aggression or violence; excessive or superhuman
strength; delusional behavior; and insensitivity to and extreme tolerance of
pain.”58 Excited delirium is a common cause of death when officers use force
against persons in custody, typically through a stun gun or taser, chokehold,
or physical restraint.59 In recent years, critics have questioned the legitimacy
of autopsy reports finding that individuals have died of excited delirium—a
medical condition not recognized by the American Medical Association,

56. See Claudia Pena, A Reaction to Beth Ribet’s Surfacing Disability Through a Critical
Race Theoretical Paradigm, 2 GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSPS. 253, 253 (2010), 2
GEOJLMCRP 253 (Westlaw) (“Race is critical in defining how disability will be read, and
will shape educational and institutional access in the future, and thus, life opportunities.”);
Subini Annamma et al., Animating Discipline Disparities Through Debilitating Practices:
Girls of Color and Inequitable Classroom Interactions, TCHRS. COLL. REC., May 2020, at 1
(“Girls of Color are overrepresented in school disciplinary actions based on subjectively
judged, minor infractions.”); Subini Ancy Annamma et al., Black Girls and School Discipline:
The Complexities of Being Overrepresented and Understudied, 54 URB. EDUC. 211, 232
(2019) (“[R]egrettably, the ‘inherited’ attributes of Black girls are often interpreted (against
the framework of conventional femininity) as obstinate, aggressive, and disobedient
behaviors.” (citation omitted) (quoting Horace R. Hall & Eleshia L. Smith, “This Is Not
Reality . . . It’s Only TV”: African American Girls Respond to Media (Mis)Representations, 8
NEW EDUCATOR 222, 225 (2012))).
57. See, e.g., Justin Jouvenal, ‘Excited Delirium’ Cited in Dozens of Deaths in Police
Custody. Is It Real or a Cover for Brutality?, WASH. POST (May 6, 2015) [hereinafter Jouvenal,
‘Excited Delirium’ Cited in Dozens of Deaths in Police Custody], https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/local/crime/existence-of-excited-delirium-ruling-in-va-womans-death-hasexperts-split/2015/05/06/b1cc9499-ddaa-474c-9e8a-9ae89a9ae679_story.html.
58. Crime Prevention Comm., Excited Delirium Syndrome, in INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF
POLICE, 2015 RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED AT THE 122ND ANNUAL CONFERENCE IN CHICAGO,
ILLINOIS 21 (2015), https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/2018-08/2015Resolutions.pdf.
59. See Jouvenal, ‘Excited Delirium’ Cited in Dozens of Deaths in Police Custody, supra
note 57.
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American Psychological Association, or the World Health Organization60—
after encounters with law enforcement or while in custody.61
Excited delirium was listed as the cause of death in an autopsy report in
one high-profile case from 2015. Natasha McKenna was a thirty-seven-yearold Black woman diagnosed with bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and
depression.62 Deputies from the Fairfax County Sheriff’s Department
arrested McKenna on an outstanding warrant after she was charged with
allegedly assaulting an Alexandria police officer in early January 2015.63
McKenna died while in custody at the Fairfax County Adult Detention

60. Dahlia Lithwick, Dying of Excitement, SLATE (June 11, 2015, 1:32 AM), https://
slate.com/news-and-politics/2015/06/excited-delirium-deaths-in-police-custody-diagnosisor-cover-up.html. Controversially, the National Association of Medical Examiners and the
American College of Emergency Physicians have recognized excited delirium as a medical
condition. Terry McGuinness & Maurice Lipsedge, ‘Excited Delirium’, Acute Behavioural
Disturbance, Death and Diagnosis, 52 PSYCH. MED. 1601, 1602 (2022); Méabh O’Hare et al.,
Perspective, Police Keep Using ‘Excited Delirium’ to Justify Brutality. It’s Junk Science,
WASH. POST (July 17, 2020, 10:55 AM EDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/
chokehold-police-excited-delirium/2020/07/17/fe907ec8-c6bc-11ea-b037-f9711f89ee46_
story.html.
61. See, e.g., Mary Paquette, Editorial, Excited Delirium: Does It Exist?, 39 PERSPS.
PSYCHIATRIC CARE 93, 93 (2003); Laura Sullivan, Death by Excited Delirium: Diagnosis or
Coverup?, NPR (Feb. 26, 2007, 4:00 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.
php?storyId=7608386; Daniel Costello, ‘Excited Delirium’ as a Cause of Death, L.A. TIMES
(Apr. 21, 2003, 12:00 AM PT), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2003-apr-21-hedelirium21-story.html.
62. Editorial, What Happened to Natasha McKenna?, WASH. POST (Feb. 20, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/what-happened-to-natasha-mckenna/2015/02/20/
4ef90ec0-b935-11e4-aa05-1ce812b3fdd2_story.html; Raymond F. Morrogh, Off. of the
Commonwealth’s Att’y, Report of Investigation: In-Custody Death 1 (Sept. 8, 2015), https://
s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2378800/mckenna.pdf.
63. See Morrogh, supra note 62, at 13. The assault allegedly occurred while the officer
was attempting to arrest McKenna in order to effectuate an involuntary mental health
evaluation. See id. at 5–10. McKenna was hospitalized on a number of occasions during the
first half of January. During this period, McKenna at times sought voluntary treatment and at
other times, was involuntarily detained. See id. at 2–5. The full details are contained in the
official report on McKenna’s death. Id. at 1–51. According to the Fairfax County Sheriff’s
Department, three separate requests were made to the Alexandria Police Department to come
pick up McKenna, but the pick-up never happened. Justin Jouvenal, Death of Inmate at
Fairfax Jail Becomes Contentious Issue in Sheriff’s Election, WASH. POST (Jun 21, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/death-of-inmate-at-fairfax-jail-becomes-cont
entious-issue-in-sheriffs-election/2015/06/21/0bc5196a-14fb-11e5-9518-f9e0a8959f32_
story.html.
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Center, and her cause of death was listed as excited delirium.64 During her
several days in custody, McKenna had exhibited symptoms of psychological
distress.65 On the day of her death, six deputies had attempted to forcibly
extract McKenna from her cell and transport her to Alexandria themselves.66
During the forcible extraction, McKenna was beaten, handcuffed, and
shackled for more than twenty minutes before officers shocked her with a
taser.67 Her breathing stopped minutes later, followed by cardiac arrest.68
Paramedics resuscitated her, but McKenna succumbed to her injuries days
later.69
What happened to Natasha McKenna is not an isolated occurrence.
Though there is limited data on the actual number of in-custody deaths
caused by excited delirium, one Amnesty International researcher estimates
that between 2001 and 2008, seventy-five of the 330 deaths that involved the
use of a taser on suspects by police were cited as caused by excited
delirium.70 In a 2015 resolution, the IACP acknowledged that “approximately
1 in 6 suspects in use-of-force incidents exhibited three or more of the classic
signs of [excited delirium].”71 In that same resolution, the IACP announced
that the association would assume a “leadership role in raising awareness by
disseminating the Model Policy on [excited delirium syndrome], and
encouraging law enforcement agencies to develop policies, procedures and
training to enhance officer safety, protect the individual exhibiting [excited
delirium syndrome] symptoms, and mitigate liability.”72 Excited delirium is
a frequent justification for deaths in custody,73 suggesting a potential
explanation for the use of force or a cause of death. As critics maintain,
64. See Morrogh, supra note 62, at 38, 48; see also Tom Jackman, The Death of Natasha
McKenna in the Fairfax Jail: The Rest of the Story, WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2015), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/local/wp/2015/04/13/the-death-of-natasha-mckenna-in-the-fair
fax-jail-the-rest-of-the-story/.
65. See Morrogh, supra note 62, at 13–17.
66. Id. at 26–28; Jackman, supra note 64.
67. Morrogh, supra note 62, at 24–34.
68. Id. at 35–38.
69. Id. at 38.
70. Jouvenal, ‘Excited Delirium’ Cited in Dozens of Deaths in Police Custody, supra note
57.
71. Crime Prevention Comm., supra note 58, at 21.
72. Id. An earlier white paper by the IACP noted that “despite what it is called or whether
it has been formally recognized, [excited delirium] is a real clinical concern for both law
enforcement and the medical communities.” Christopher Baxter, Excited Delirium: A Medical
Emergency or Unscientific Excuse?, NJ.COM (Oct. 1, 2014, 10:00 AM), https://www.nj.com/
news/2014/10/excited_delirium_a_medical_emergency_or_unscientific_excuse.html.
73. Lithwick, supra note 60.
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because autopsy reports typically list excited delirium rather than the stun
gun or taser as the primary cause of death, the condition can serve as a cover
for excessive force by law enforcement.74 Deaths in officer-involved
confrontations from excited delirium continue.75
For negatively racialized persons, disability has been used to disempower,
subordinate, and justify Black death. Disability can provide a direct basis for
producing—or constructing—criminality or “criminals,” and can be erased
or manipulated in order to justify the use of force.76 In one recent example,
police records related to the killing of Daniel Prude by officers from the
Rochester Police Department included the notation, “Make him a suspect.”77
In another example of this narrative in a case involving private violence, the
actions of a twenty-five-year-old Black man, Ahmaud Arbery, in defending
himself against an armed attack were explained by reference to his mental
health record. In his letter to the Glynn County Police Department, District
Attorney George E. Barnhill writes, “Arbery’s mental health records & prior
convictions help explain his apparent aggressive nature and his possible
thought pattern to attack an armed man.”78 Focusing on disability along with
race provides nuance to understanding the unique vulnerabilities of disabled
people of color, like Prude, but also how it can be manipulated to justify

74. Id.; see also Baxter, supra note 72.
75. See, e.g., Associated Press, Attorney: Man Tazed, Beaten in Police Custody Suffered
from Mental Illness; His Death Is a Homicide, WBRZ (June 11, 2020, 4:21 AM),
https://www.wbrz.com/news/attorney-man-tazed-beaten-in-police-custody-suffered-frommental-illness-his-death-is-a-homicide/. For cases that discuss “excited delirium” as the cause
of an “officer-involved” death, see Rachel v. City of Mobile, 112 F. Supp. 3d 1263, 1290 (S.D.
Ala. 2015); Galack v. PTS of Am., LLC, No. 4:13-CV-0288-HLM, 2015 WL 5692327, at *1
(N.D. Ga. July 6, 2015); Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1304 (11th Cir. 2009); and
Gregory v. Cnty. of Maui, 523 F.3d 1103, 1105–06 (9th Cir. 2008).
76. See, e.g., Nelson, Frontlines, supra note 44, at 618–19 (discussing ways in which
negatively racialized individuals are labeled as crazy by law enforcement despite actual mental
health diagnoses); Camille A. Nelson, Racializing Disability, Disabling Race: Policing Race
and Mental Status, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 3 (2010) (discussing criminalization and
excessive force against people of color with psychiatric disabilities).
77. Michael Wilson & Edgar Sandoval, Documents Reveal How the Police Kept Daniel
Prude’s Death Quiet, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/15/
nyregion/rochester-police-daniel-prude.html.
78. Letter from George E. Barnhill, Dist. Att’y, Waycross Jud. Cir., to Tom Jump,
Captain, Glynn Cnty. Police Dep’t (Apr. 2, 2020), https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/
6916-george-barnhill-letter-to-glyn/b52fa09cdc974b970b79/optimized/full.pdf. It is also
imperative that I note that, in discussing how these labels have been used to denigrate
negatively racialized groups, I also reject the use of such labels deployed to demean and
dehumanize disabled people.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2022

182

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:169

forms of violence and to reinforce ongoing forms of disability-based
subordination.
That racial ideology worked (and works) to construct disability labels and
categories for the purposes of segregation and confinement of those labeled
as disabled and should not be taken to suggest that diagnoses for negatively
racialized groups are inherently pathological in every individual case.
Indeed, organizations and movements that address this issue of diagnosis are
not united in their views on the value of diagnosis. For example, movements
like the psychiatric survivors movement have challenged the dominance of
medical professionals and the medical-industrial complex. In the diagnosis
process, these groups have acknowledged the race-classed nature of
diagnosis while also acknowledging the social import and necessity, in some
cases, of diagnoses to this day.79 In another case, the Black Panther Party
openly advocated against the use of medical diagnoses to exclude Black
students.80 In her award-winning book, Alondra Nelson discusses the Party’s
clinics and how they operated on the idea that life experiences provided a
mode of expertise to the benefit of the patients.81 As she notes, “The Black
Panther organization endeavored to give voice to patients’ experiences partly
by privileging the judgment and perspective of those individuals or
communities over that of healthcare professionals.”82
Centering disability in discussions on policing demonstrates how it
functions to render white disabled people vulnerable to police violence.
Different forms of privilege—such as those based on race, class, ability,
sexuality, and citizenship—interact in such a way that an individual holding
one type of privilege may still be marginalized in society based on the lack
of another type of privilege. By centering discussions of policing on the lens
on disability, along with race and racial privilege, it is easier to see how white
disabled people are vulnerable to state police violence. More broadly, and in
line with the important work of Professor Khiara Bridges, a focus on
disability shows how a lack of able-bodied privilege interacts with race
privilege and what harms may accrue vis-à-vis the state.83 Though data on
79. See Our Mission, PROJECT LETS, https://projectlets.org/mission (last visited Apr. 24,
2022).
80. See ALONDRA NELSON, BODY AND SOUL: THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AND THE FIGHT
AGAINST MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION 136 (2011) (featuring Black Panther Party stories of
African American women who were denied admission to nursing school based on their
diagnoses of sickle cell anemia).
81. See id. at 84.
82. Id. at 88.
83. Cf. Khiara M. Bridges, White Privilege and White Disadvantage, 105 VA. L. REV.
449, 450 n.5 (2019) (noting that her article “grapples with what the lack of class privilege
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police use of force is limited, and data on disability and policing is limited
even more so, available data suggests “that although white people and
women are generally less at risk for police violence, this experience does not
extend to white people and women who suffer from mental illness.” 84
Furthermore, according to researchers, “while non-Hispanic white people
make up a relatively small percentage of the total population shot and killed
by police overall, white people who showed signs of mental illness make up
a large percentage of total non-Hispanic white deaths (32%) in police
encounters.”85
Of course, this should not be taken to suggest that white disabled people
do not possess any race privilege in the policing context as a general matter.
What I do suggest is that in police encounters, disabled white people, despite
racial privilege, may face disadvantages on account of their disability. As
Khiara Bridges has argued, in some cases, disabled people may be
disadvantaged because of their white privilege—that is, white privilege may
lead to white disadvantage.86 Discussing the criminalization of white
pregnant women who use opioids, Bridges writes that “these women possess
a compromised, marginalized, ‘not-quite’ whiteness — a corrupted
whiteness that has yielded to them a reduced racial privilege. . . . [T]he
marginalized white women subject to arrest and prosecution for using opioids
during pregnancy exist at the limits of whiteness.”87 What this suggests, in
Bridges’s words, is that “the racial privilege that they would otherwise have
had has been limited — making it unable to protect its holders from penal
state power.”88 Some of the women that Bridges discusses are women with

might mean for race privilege”); Khiara M. Bridges, Race, Pregnancy, and the Opioid
Epidemic: White Privilege and the Criminalization of Opioid Use During Pregnancy, 133
HARV. L. REV. 770, 776 (2020) [hereinafter Bridges, Race, Pregnancy, and the Opioid
Epidemic].
84. See Kyle Lane-McKinley et al., The Deborah Danner Story: Officer-Involved Deaths
of People Living with Mental Illness, 42 ACAD. PSYCHIATRY 443, 445 (2018).
85. Id. Interestingly, the researchers also noted that “African Americans showing signs of
mental illness make up a relatively small proportion of the total number of African American
people killed by police when compared with the proportion of white people showing signs of
mental illness who were killed by police.” Id. Such findings suggest that showing “suffering
from mental illness does not place an African American individual at significantly greater
risk” of police violence. See id.
86. Bridges, Race, Pregnancy, and the Opioid Epidemic, supra note 83, at 851.
87. Id. at 776 (emphasis omitted).
88. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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disabilities.89 Whether each pregnant woman charged with using opioids falls
under the protections of the ADA is less to the point, but I raise it to provide
a potential application of the broader theoretical claim: that white privilege
may render white disabled people vulnerable to police violence.
II. Disability Incarcerated
No discussion on disability and the criminal legal system would be
complete without the constellation of prisons, jails, immigration detention
centers, and juvenile detention centers that make up the carceral state. In this
Part, I focus only on prisons and jails, though advocacy in immigration
detention centers and juvenile detention centers is growing in recent years.90
The period of mass incarceration, or more accurately race- and class-based
incarceration, and the rates of incarceration in the United States are
unprecedented in the course of human history.91 The United States, with just
5% of the world’s population, holds nearly 25% of those who are
imprisoned.92 Racial critiques of mass incarceration are by now well
known.93 These critiques have brought to mainstream public consciousness
and politics the harms of mass incarceration on communities of color and
particularly low-income communities of color.94 They have emphasized the
89. See id. at 830–32. Though the ADA does not provide coverage for people with
substance use dependencies who are actively using, it does provide protections for those in
treatment or formerly in treatment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12114(b)(1)–(2).
90. See, e.g., Ted Hesson & Mica Rosenberg, U.S. to Close, Scale Back Four Immigrant
Detention Centers, REUTERS (Mar. 25, 2022, 1:36 PM CDT), https://www.reuters.com/
world/us/us-plans-close-scale-back-four-immigrant-detention-centers-document-shows2022-03-25/; SAMANTHA HARVELL ET AL., URB. INST., CLOSING YOUTH PRISONS: LESSONS
FROM AGENCY ADMINISTRATORS (2020), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publica
tion/101917/closing-youth-prisons-lessons-from-agency-administrators_1.pdf.
91. See Greg Miller, The Invention of Incarceration, KNOWABLE MAG. (Mar. 18, 2022),
https://knowablemagazine.org/article/society/2022/prison-history-ashley-rubin-qa.
92. Criminal Justice Reform, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, https://eji.org/criminal-justicereform/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2022) (citing James Cullen, The United States Is (Very) Slowly
Reducing Incarceration, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.brennan
center.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/united-states-very-slowly-reducing-incarceration).
93. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012); DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE,
CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1995); JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN:
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA (2017); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND
THE LAW (1997).
94. See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African
American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1281–97 (2004).
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racial disparities reflected in the criminal legal system, as well as the racial
logics that have undergirded the unprecedented growth of incarceration.95
Disability critiques are less well known, but within the last decade, there
has been a surge of scholarship specifically focused on the experiences of
disabled people in not just prisons and jails, but also on the carceral
conditions replicated in psychiatric wards, group homes, and nursing
homes.96 A disability lens on the problem of mass incarceration is necessary
for several reasons, including the disproportionate rates of disabled people in
prisons and jails and the harsh conditions, challenges, and harms they
experience while incarcerated.
Many American prisoners have at least one disability. The most recent
national study, by the U.S. Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice
Statistics, found that 26% of incarcerated people have a disability.97
Specifically, the study found that 10% report a mobility impairment, 10%
report that they are deaf or low-hearing, and 12% report that they are blind
or low-vision (uncorrectable with glasses).98 Prisoners also have intellectual
disabilities, psychiatric disabilities, and chronic medical conditions:
Depending on the facility and the definition, 4% to 10% have an
intellectual disability. And over half report symptoms that meet
the criteria for various mental illnesses; mania and depression
predominate, but 15% of state prisoners have symptoms of
psychosis, such as delusions or hallucinations. Forty percent of
prisoners have some kind of chronic medical condition—diabetes,
cancer, heart disease, high blood pressure, etc. All these statistics
are for post-conviction prisoners . . . .99

95. See ALEXANDER, supra note 93; ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO
THE WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2016).

96. See, e.g., BEN-MOSHE, DECARCERATING DISABILITY, supra note 3, at 37–40; Daniel
Yohanna, Deinstitutionalization of People with Mental Illness: Causes and Consequences, 15
AMA J. ETHICS 886, 886 (2013), https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/sites/journalofethics.
ama-assn.org/files/2018-05/mhst1-1310.pdf.
97. LAURA M. MARUSCHAK ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SURVEY OF PRISON INMATES,
2016: DISABILITIES REPORTED BY PRISONERS 1 (2021), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/
drpspi16st.pdf.
98. Id. at 1, 5.
99. Margo Schlanger, Prisoners with Disabilities, in REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE
VOLUME 4: PUNISHMENT, INCARCERATION, AND RELEASE 295, 295 (Erik Luna ed., 2017),
https://law.asu.edu/sites/default/files/pdf/academy_for_justice/Reforming-Criminal-Justice_
Vol_4.pdf.
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Women are the fastest-growing segment of the incarcerated here in the
United States.100 Forty-seven out of every 100,000 women were in prison in
2020,101 including one in 111 white women, one in eighteen Black women,
and one in forty-five Latina women.102 Our nation incarcerates nearly onethird of all the women in prison worldwide, according to a 2014 report by the
International Centre for Prison Studies.103 Many of these incarcerated women
are living with disabilities, and women with disabilities represent a high
percentage of incarcerated women.104 As many as 49.8% of women
incarcerated in state institutions and 40.2% of women incarcerated in federal
institutions meet the criteria for at least one disability.105 Nearly 73% of
incarcerated women in state institutions and 47% of incarcerated women in
federal institutions used drugs regularly prior to incarceration.106 Incarcerated
women have higher rates of disability than the general population: “12% of
females in the general population have symptoms of a mental disorder,” or a
psychiatric disability—a term I use instead of mental illness or disorder—
“compared to 73% of females in state prison, 61% in federal prison, and 75%
in local jails.”107
Incarcerated women were more likely than incarcerated men to report
having a physical disability.108 In a 2021 Bureau of Justice Statistics report,
disability was defined to include hearing, vision, cognitive, and ambulatory
100. See Aleks Kajstura, Women’s Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2019, PRISON
POL’Y INITIATIVE (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2019women.html
(“Women’s incarceration has grown at twice the pace of men’s incarceration in recent
decades, and has disproportionately been located in local jails.”).
101. INCARCERATED WOMEN AND GIRLS, SENT’G PROJECT (2022), https://www.sentencing
project.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Incarcerated-Women-and-Girls.pdf.
102. Michele Goodwin, The New Jane Crow: Women’s Mass Incarceration, JUST SEC.
(July 20, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/71509/the-new-jane-crow-womens-mass-incar
ceration/.
103. Niall McCarthy, Nearly a Third of All Female Prisoners Worldwide Are Incarcerated
in the United States [Infographic], FORBES (Sept. 23, 2014, 8:46 AM EDT),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2014/09/23/nearly-a-third-of-all-female-prisonersworldwide-are-incarcerated-in-the-united-states-infographic/?sh=4153ab3f10af.
104. See MARUSCHAK ET AL., supra note 97, at 3–4 (reporting disabilities for 49.8% of
female state prisoners and 40.2% of female federal prisoners).
105. Id.
106. Barbara E. Bloom & Stephanie Covington, Addressing the Mental Health Needs of
Women Offenders, in WOMEN’S MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES ACROSS THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 160, 161 (citing CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SUBSTANCE ABUSE
AND TREATMENT, STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONERS, 1997, at 7 (1999)).
107. Id. (citing DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., MENTAL HEALTH
PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 4 (2006)).
108. See MARUSCHAK ET AL., supra note 97, at 1.
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disabilities.109 It also included disabilities that provide challenges with selfcare and independent living, which refers to the ability to navigate daily life
schedules, activities, and events without assistance.110 In the study, about
40% of women and 28% of men in prison and 50% of women and 39% of
men in jail reported a disability.111
Despite these significant numbers, there is evidence that prisons and jails
are routinely failing to meet the needs of women with disabilities. A few
anecdotal accounts demonstrate the nature and scope of the harms
experienced by women with disabilities in particular:
$

Forty-three-year-old Michelle Kindoll experienced multiple strokes
while confined in a northern Kentucky jail.112 Rather than providing
her with proper treatment, jail personnel transferred Kindoll to an
isolated cell for several days.113 While confined, she suffered
multiple strokes.114 According to a federal lawsuit, “medical staff
ignored her symptoms, which included a numb leg, curling arm and
slurred speech,”115 and accused her of being disruptive.116

$

Following amputation surgery, Martinique Stoudemire contracted
MRSA, a serious bacterial infection, while at Huron Valley
Women’s Facility.117 “Prison policy required that Stoudemire be
quarantined in a segregation unit due to her infection . . . . Stoudemire
claimed that prison officials managing the Huron Valley Women’s
Facility held her in solitary confinement for two weeks with limited
medical assistance and absolutely no contact with a prison doctor.
She alleged that she received ‘extremely poor medical care while in
segregation,’ and that the ‘cells were not equipped to accommodate’

109. Id.
110. Id. at 1, 1 n.1, 5.
111. Id. at 1.
112. Kindoll v. S. Health Partners, No. 17-84-DLB-CJS, 2019 WL 1409842, at *1, *6
(E.D. Ky. Mar. 28, 2019); Max Londberg & Chris Mayhew, NKY Jail Placed Woman Having
Strokes in Solitary for Several Days. Now She’s Disabled, Suit Says, CINCINNATI.COM (May
18, 2019, 5:05 PM ET), https://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/2019/05/18/suit-nky-jail-putwoman-having-strokes-solitary-missed-symptoms/3721656002/.
113. Kindoll, 2019 WL 1409842, at *3.
114. Id. at *6.
115. Londberg & Mayhew, supra note 112; Kindoll, 2019 WL 1409842, at *3–4.
116. Kindoll, 2019 WL 1409842, at *3.
117. JAMELIA MORGAN, ACLU, CAGED IN: SOLITARY CONFINEMENT’S DEVASTATING
HARM ON PRISONERS WITH PHYSICAL DISABILITIES 39 (2017), https://www.aclu.org/sites/
default/files/field_document/010916-aclu-solitarydisabilityreport-single.pdf.
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her disability. Specifically, she alleged that she ‘was never provided
with any assistive devices that might have allowed her to safely move
between her bed, wheelchair, toilet, and shower,’ and that ‘[t]here
was no call button, so Stoudemire had to shout when she needed
assistance.’ Stoudemire was ‘forced to crawl from her bed to the
toilet.’ On one occasion, she defecated on herself when staff failed
to respond to her requests for assistance. During her two weeks in
segregation, Stoudemire ‘received only one shower . . . and was
required to dress her wounds herself, which put her at risk of
infection.’ The Michigan Department of Corrections settled the suit
with Stoudemire in May 2016, awarding her over $200,000 for the
harm caused.”118
$

“Erika Rocha spent her 35th birthday confined at California
Institution for Women in Chino Valley. The women in her tier threw
her a Tinker Bell party to celebrate. . . . [O]n April 14, Rocha’s body
was discovered hanging in her 10-by-15-foot cell. Rocha’s parole
hearing had been scheduled for the next day. According to
investigative reporters, stories like Erika’s have become far too
common at California Institution for Women, a facility known for its
surge in suicides and suicide attempts in the last few years. Six
women have died by suicide at the prison since the start of 2013, and
there have been 73 suicide attempts, according to the California
Department of Corrections. Prisoner-rights advocates say the
number of attempts is likely higher. The suicide rate at CIW, as
reported by the Department of Corrections, is five times the state
average, and four to five times the national average for all female
inmates in state prisons.”119

$

In 2019, Layleen Polanco, an Afro-Latinx trans woman died at
Rikers Island after personnel failed to get her medical treatment
when she had an epileptic seizure in solitary confinement.120 Video

118. Id. (second and third alteration in original) (quoting Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of
Corr., 614 F. App’x 798, 800 (6th Cir. 2015)).
119. Jamelia N. Morgan, An Intersectional Approach to Understanding the Challenges
Facing Incarcerated Women, INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DE CIÊNCIAS CRIMINAIS (Sept. 16, 2019),
https://www.ibccrim.org.br/noticias/exibir/7129/.
120. Kate Sosin, New Video Reveals Layleen Polanco’s Death at Rikers Was Preventable,
Family Says, NBC NEWS (June 13, 2020, 4:05 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/
feature/nbc-out/new-video-reveals-layleen-polanco-s-death-rikers-was-preventable-n12309
51; Chelsia Rose Marcius, Bronx District Attorney Will Not Pursue Charges in the Death of
Transgender Woman Layleen Polanco at Rikers Island, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 5, 2020, 4:32
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footage from outside of her cell showed that guards waited for
approximately an hour and a half before calling for medical help.121
These systemic failures within prisons and jails reflect the failure of prison
systems to respond to the needs of disabled people. They also reflect the most
recent iterations of legacies of institutionalization and segregation—twin
forms of disability subordination persisting to the present day. The
prevalence of disabled people in prison indicates widespread vulnerabilities
to imprisonment but also criminalization produced by, as some scholars
suggest, proximity to violence, poverty, houselessness, and a lack of access
to appropriate and quality health care.
Psychiatric disability—whether diagnosed or mislabeled, and particularly
where untreated—increases one’s risk of ending up in jail or prison. The high
proportion of disabled people in carceral spaces suggests at the very least that
the causes and consequences of disability might correspond with risk factors
for incarceration. For example, poverty, lack of access to medical and mental
health care, and lack of accessible and affordable housing stem from and
produce debility and risks of incarceration.122 At the same time, I dispute the
framing that prisons and jails are the “new asylums,” as informed by Liat
Ben-Moshe’s work.123 Ben-Moshe challenges the framing of prisons and jails
as the new asylums because “such discourse reduces a much more complex
process and points the blame toward an easy target—deinstitutionalization—
and away from discussions of neo-liberal policies that led simultaneously to
the growth of the prison system and to a lack of financial support for people
with disabilities to live in the community.”124 Thus, while it is important to
understand how disabled people are rendered vulnerable to criminalization
and incarceration, explaining criminalization and incarceration as simply a
PM), https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/ny-bronx-district-attorney-rikers-island-lay
leen-polanco-20200605-tpuks2n3q5fmpli5kzoaoqmcwy-story.html.
121. Sosin, supra note 120.
122. See, e.g., Niloofar Ramezani et al., The Relationship Between Community Public
Health, Behavioral Health Service Accessibility, and Mass Incarceration, BMC HEALTH
SERVS. RSCH. 966 (2022), https://doi.org/10.1186/s12913-022-08306-6; Disability &
Socioeconomic Status, AM. PSYCH. ASS’N (2010), https://www.apa.org/pi/ses/resources/
publications/disability; Connections Among Poverty, Incarceration, and Inequality, INST. FOR
RSCH. ON POVERTY (May 2020), https://www.irp.wisc.edu/resource/connections-amongpoverty-incarceration-and-inequality/; Kevin M. Simon et al., Addressing Poverty and Mental
Illness, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (June 28, 2018), https://www.psychiatrictimes.com/view/address
ing-poverty-and-mental-illness.
123. See BEN-MOSHE, DECARCERATING DISABILITY, supra note 3, at 136.
124. Id. at 138 (“[T]he new asylums discourse medicalizes, pathologizes, and psychiatrizes
what is a deeply political and socioeconomic issue.”).
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product of disability is overly simplistic and inconsistent with empirical
studies, as Lea Johnston’s work has carefully demonstrated.125
An intersectional approach to race and disability demonstrates how these
vulnerabilities to harm are heightened for people of color and low-income
people who have disabilities. Such an approach centers the well-documented
problems of mass criminalization and mass incarceration as not only a racialjustice problem, but also a disability-justice problem. It focuses in on the
complexities of the most recent iterations of legacies of institutionalization
and segregation of disabled people.126 If we see mass incarceration as, in part,
a site of disability-based subordination, along with racial, gender, and classbased subordination, our approach to the problem of mass incarceration
changes. And, importantly, an intersectional approach offers a lens through
which to identify more inclusive and effective solutions to the problems
identified.

125. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 2, at 521–22 (“Studies demonstrate that these
[criminogenic risk] factors motivate the criminal activity of those with and without mental
disorders alike.”).
126. See, e.g., BEN-MOSHE, DECARCERATING DISABILITY, supra note 3, at 39; DISABILITY
INCARCERATED: IMPRISONMENT AND DISABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (Liat
Ben-Moshe et al. eds, 2014).
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